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Abstract: We consider an oligopoly of firms that compete on price. Firms produce a non-stochastic 
output, insurance coverage, which is sold before the true cost is known. They behave as if 
they were risk-averse for a standard reason of costly external finance. The model consists in a 
two-stage game. At stage 1, each firm chooses its internal capital level. At stage 2, firms 
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choice on the market. We discuss the model with regard to insurance industry specificity and 
regulation. 
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1 Introduction
This article presents a model of capital choice for insurance ﬁrms with costly external
ﬁnance in an oligopoly setting. Determining the appropriate levels of capital holding
and investment in risk management is a major component of insurers and reinsur-
ers' activities, as well as a prominent regulatory issue. Due to the trend towards
consolidation of the last two decades, insurance market are far from being perfectly
competitive. In the context of imperfect competition, ﬁrms' price and capital de-
cisions can be expected to become strategic variables. This leads to consider the
question of capital regulation with a diﬀerent perspective. Price regulation is some-
thing diﬃcult to put in place on the insurance market except through discrimination
exclusion. However, in a market where capital choice and solvability are crucial
and where cycles linking prices and capital are observed empirically, it is useful to
understand how capital decisions are impacted by imperfect competition.
There are two fundamental reasons for an insurance ﬁrm to invest in risk management
and costly capital holding. The ﬁrst one is the concern for quality. The nature of
the insurance contract is essentially a promise to deliver indemnities ex-post in some
states of Nature in exchange for a premium paid in advance. The credibility of such
promise is a major preoccupation of policyholders. A contract with non-zero default
risk has a lower value for the policyholder than a fully credible contract, so consumers
have a lower propensity to pay for it. Hence proﬁt-maximizing insurance ﬁrms have a
rationale to reduce the probability of default when consumers are aware and sensitive
to it, by investing in risk management activities, and/or holding a suﬃcient level of
capital that plays the role of a buﬀer stock. This aspect refers to the solvency issue
(Zanjani, 2002; Rees et al., 1999). The second explanation relies on direct state-
contingent costs that make the ﬁrms' payoﬀs becoming non-linear and so justify the
use of risk management and capital holding strategies, even if shareholders-managers,
considered as the same entity, are risk neutral. These non-linearities may include
i. the presence of convex taxes on corporate earnings, ii. ﬁnancial distress costs,
iii. costly external funds due to costly state veriﬁcation (Gollier, 2007; Froot et al.,
1993)1. These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and give so many reasons
for insurance and reinsurance ﬁrms to reinsure themselves, hedge, manage risks and
participate in insurance pools (Froot, 2007). In a recent paper, Froot (2007) analyses
risk management decisions for an insurance ﬁrm, as well as its capital budgeting and
structure decisions, illustrating the trade-oﬀ between holding more internal costly
initial capital and limiting risk aversion thanks to a higher level of internal funds.
If such rationales for risk management and capital holding by insurers and reinsurers
are well understood (at least theoretically), less is known about how these decisions
operate in the strategic context of imperfect competition. This lack of interest may
1Note that there is also a theoretical explanation that, on the contrary, supports the assumption
of risk-loving behavior of ﬁrms: limited liability, in a context of agency problems between creditors,
who bear the cost of distress if it occurs, and owners, who get the beneﬁts as long as they exist,
but are protected by a limited liability constraint if the ﬁrm goes bankrupt.
come from the fact that insurance markets are usually considered to be competitive.
Although this assumption is well-documented, there are also arguments in favour of
imperfect competition as a more appropriate framework in the cases of specialized
insurance companies (Nye and Hoander, 1987) and the reinsurance sector (Gron,
1990). Moreover, since the insurance premiums are partly determined by the prices
and capacities of reinsurance market, the degree of competition in the reinsurance
sector does matter for the insurance one. Intuitively, the introduction of imperfect
competition may have consequences on pricing and capital decisions: when ﬁrms
compete strategically in an oligopolistic market, risk management decisions may
be distorted by strategic eﬀects. These distortions may in turn aﬀect insurance
supply decisions, that is which lines of risks to cover and at which unit price. More
capitalized ﬁrms would be able to accept more risks, and so capital holding could
increase their market shares on lines of risks that are characterized by high aggregate
uncertainty.
The purpose of this paper is to study the endogenous choice of capital holding and
pricing decisions for an oligopoly of (re)insurance ﬁrms that face costly external
ﬁnance. We build on Froot et al. (1993), which provides one of the canonical ex-
planations for ﬁrms' risk management based on the assumption that internal capital
is less costly than external capital. We consider a price competition setting similar
to Wambach (1999). Indeed argued by Rees et al. (1999), price competition seems
more natural than quantity competition if rationing the supply is diﬃcult once the
price of the product has been posted (Vives, 1999), as it is the case in the insurance
sector. In the model, the number of insurers is exogenous. Insurers cover a single line
of risk which is characterized by aggregate uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty on the level
of the aggregate expected loss2. This uncertainty may arise from correlated risks
across policyholders, a typical feature of natural disaster risks, such as earthquake,
drought etc. Alternatively, it may also be interpreted as knightian uncertainty; this
is typically characteristic of new technological risks, for which the probability dis-
tribution cannot be derived from past observations. In this framework, we analyze
the strategic choice of capital for insurance ﬁrms. Under imperfect competition,
holding more capital reduces the cost of risk for ﬁrms but has also consequences
on competition through the ﬁrms' price-setting game. As in Wambach (1999), we
obtain a continuum of Nash equilibrium prices, allowing for positive oligopolistic
rents. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion assumption, we ﬁnd that the choice
of capital is strategic for the ﬁrms as playing safer on the capital market induces a
harsher behavior on the product market. We underline the importance of the cost of
capital in the insurance industry outcomes. Finally, we propose a diﬀerent approach
to the question of capital regulation, complementary to the classical quality argu-
ment (Plantin and Rochet, 2007): required levels of capital may have an impact on
2When risks are statistically independent across policyholders, risk management and capital
budgeting decisions are still an issue since the probability of default is never null, but it is clear
that the problem becomes more stringent when there is aggregate uncertainty about the expected
proﬁt from a line of risk.
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competition prices, and thus be beneﬁcial in a social welfare perspective.
Related literature . Polborn (1998) andWambach (1999) consider an oligopoly
of n ﬁrms with risk-averse managers, producing a single output. Marginal cost is
constant but stochastic. Firms commit to the price of the output before the marginal
cost is revealed, and then serve the whole demand they face at the committed price,
which is typically the Bertrand assumption. Such assumptions appear to ﬁt very
well with the insurance and reinsurance markets where the cost of a given line of
(re)insurance is not known with certainty at the time contracts are sold, i.e. the
production cycle is reversed. In such setting, they ﬁnd that the Bertrand paradox
(Tirole, 1988) -i.e. the fact that at least two competitors are suﬃcient to restore
the competitive price outcome- can be resolved3 in the sense that there exists Nash
price equilibria above the expected marginal cost, which lead to strictly positive
oligopolistic rents. There are also multiple equilibria (Wambach, 1999) due to a
trade-oﬀ between expected proﬁt and risk for each of the competing ﬁrms. Asplund
(2002) generalizes the analysis to complementary or substitute strategies and takes
into account the possible covariations across ﬁrms' individual risks. He also notes
the importance of initial wealth and ﬁxed cost on the resulting Nash equilibria when
ﬁrms display decreasing absolute risk aversion. Duncan and Myers (2000) consider
the same kind of model but allow for free entry, so the number of insurers that
serve the market is endogenous and depends on their reservation utility, which is
assumed exogenous. Because of ﬁrms' risk aversion in presence of catastrophic and
correlated risks, insurance supply that emerges at the equilibrium is rationed. Froot
and O'Connell (2008) also introduce imperfect competition in an oligopoly of n risk
averse insurers with correlated portfolios and a risk-averse representative reinsurer
that pools insurers' risks, in a context of Cournot competition. They suggest that
imperfect competition tends to reinforce the overpricing of correlated risks when
compared to the fair price.
Our paper can also be related to a strand of literature derived from Brander and
Lewis (1986), that analyzes the strategic value of debt emission for ﬁrms in oligopoly
markets. In particular, the timing is similar, with two-periods models where ﬁnancial
decisions are taken at stage 1 and productions decisions at stage 2. The strategic
value of debt holding depends on the type of uncertainty faced by the market -
demand or cost - and the type of competition (Wanzenried, 2003). We depart here
from this literature as we focus on the impact of risk aversion on the choice of ex-ante
equity capital, from the investor's point of view: risk aversion enhances the weight
of high cost states, rendering capital level a strategic choice as it modiﬁes the price
equilibria.
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 lays out the competition game; Section 3
and 4 derives the results on the impact of capital holding on the competitive structure
3This issue is close to considering price competition with convex costs, as do Weibull (2006) and
Vives (1999). Both literature are closely linked.
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of the market; Section 5 looks at the social welfare and capital regulation. Section 6
discusses these results in line with the insurance industry speciﬁcities and concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The oligopoly market
We consider an oligopoly of n insurance ﬁrms, indexed by i = 1...n, that produce
the same non-diﬀerentiated single good qi that can be thought of as a quantity
of insurance coverage sold to a continuum of risk-averse insureds. The aggregate
demand for coverage is exogenous, non-stochastic, and deﬁned by Q(p) when all
insurance companies charge the same price p. Q(p) is continuous, decreasing in p
and lim
p→+∞Q(p) = 0.
Because of the inversion of the production cycle, insurance ﬁrms do not know ex-
ante the exact cost of supplying such coverage4. Let us denote L˜i ∈ [0, Lmax] the
stochastic loss per unit of output (or coverage) qi sold by the ﬁrm i. We note L¯i =
EL˜i. Cost uncertainty may be particularly relevant in (re)insurance markets where
individual risks exhibit positive correlations which is a typical feature of catastrophic
risks. Alternatively, cost uncertainty may also reﬂect the imperfect knowledge of
the "true" probability distribution of the loss, due to a lack of data, a situation
that is typical of new technological risks, or natural disaster risks. Because of cost
uncertainty, the proﬁt from exerting the insurance activity is stochastic. For a ﬁrm
i and a given price p, let us deﬁne p˜ii(p, qi) as follows
p˜ii(p, qi) = qi(p− L˜i) = qim˜i (1)
where m˜i = p − L˜i is the stochastic unit margin. When the insurance coverage is
fairly priced, i.e. p− L¯i = 0 and the insurance activity entails no transaction costs,
the ﬁrm i's expected proﬁt is equal to zero, as in the standard competitive model
with risk neutral insurers. If, due to market power, the per unit price is strictly above
the expected loss per unit, i.e. p− L¯i > 0, then increasing supply qi (via increasing
market-share) increases the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm, but also makes proﬁt riskier.
This is the fundamental trade-oﬀ that will be at the heart of the following analysis.
To keep things simple, we will consider that the loss L˜ per unit of output is the same
for all insurance ﬁrms. Whether they are correlated or not is not important in our
framework, since coverage is sold before the true realization of losses.
2.2 Firms' objectives
The managers are supposed to maximize the value of the ﬁrm. Following Froot,
Scharfstein and Stein (Froot et al., 1993), such objective may lead to an apparent
4This cost can be approximated by the expected loss plus a loading factor that covers a set
of various transaction costs (administrative costs, ambiguity aversion, security margin and so on).
Even in situations where the law of large numbers applies well, the cost of a given insured risk
remains fundamentally stochastic.
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risk-averse behavior when external sources of ﬁnance are more costly than internal
ones. Let us recall their model. The ﬁrm faces a two-period investment and ﬁnancing
choice. The investment requires an expenditure I and has a net return F (I) =
f(I) − I, where f is an increasing and concave function. This investment may be
ﬁnanced through the ﬁrm's internal assets w as well as through external capital
e acquired at a cost c(e). The problem for ﬁrms is that there are dead weight
costs of raising such external ﬁnance, due to several reasons including distress costs
and informational asymmetries as argued in Froot et al. (1993). Formally, these
dead weight costs are captured by the fact that c(.) is convex. The solution of the
investment/ﬁnancing problem is given by
max
I
P (w) = F (I)− c(e) (2)
s.t. I = w + e
The value of the ﬁrm, denoted P (w) is the maximand of the programme. By analogy
with the usual deﬁnition of the risk premium (Gollier, 2001), with the diﬀerence that
the function P (.) replaces the standard von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function
u(.), Let R(W0, x˜) be given by
EP (W0 + x˜) = P [W0 −R(W0, x˜)]
where W0 is the level of initial wealth and x˜ a zero mean risk . Here, the ﬁrm i
is endowed with an initial level of capital wi. She covers an amount of risk qi of
uncertain loss L˜, at price p. Her ﬁnal wealth is W˜ i = wi + (p − L˜)qi. We note
W¯ = EW˜ i. The 0-mean risk to which it is exposed is : (L˜− EL)qi. For notational
simplicity, we note the risk premium Ri(W¯ i, qi) and we have:
EP (W˜ i) = P [W¯ i −Ri(W¯ i, qi)] (3)
We make the following assumptions :
• (A1) ∂P∂w ≥ 1 and ∂
2P
∂w2
≤ 0
• (A2) ∂Ri
∂W¯
≤ 0
• (A3) for m = 1 and n ddpEP (wi + (p− L)Q(p)/m) ≥ 0
• (A4)The proﬁt maximizing output of the ﬁrms increases when the price increases.
The following comments are in order. (A1) follows from the concavity of f and
convexity of c. This is just a consequence of the envelop theorem (Froot et al.,
1993). It implies the risk averse behavior of ﬁrms, and its corollary that managing,
sharing and/or reducing the risks on internal assets can increase their value. If this
internal capital is stochastic, the ex-ante value of the ﬁrm, and so the objective to
maximize, is given by EP (w˜). Since P (.) is concave, it is clear that the pseudo risk
premium has similar characteristics than the standard risk premium. In particular,
Ri is increasing and convex in qi. (A2) is the standard decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA) hypothesis. (A3) states that demand is suﬃciently inelastic.
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2.3 Timing of the game
We consider n ﬁrms endowed with a level of initial capital wi0, which can be in-
terpreted as their past proﬁts. The market equilibrium is modelled as a subgame
perfect equilibrium (in short equilibrium) of the following two-stage game
• At stage 1: Firms choose a level of additional capital Ki by issuing new shares
(if Ki ≥ 0) or by buying them back (if Ki ≤ 0). Firm i's wealth becomes
wi1 = w
i
0 +K
i.
• At stage 2: Each ﬁrm posts its own price and commits to sell any quantity at
this price.
At stage 1, ﬁrms choose their additional capital level K by maximizing the expected
net value: P (wif ) − (1 + τ)Ki. The capital has an opportunity cost, τK, for the
investors where 0 ≤ τ . At stage 2, a price competition, in the same manner as in
Wambach (1999), takes place between the n value-maximizing ﬁrms. Firms compete
on price before the true cost is revealed by Nature: the ﬁrm with the lowest price
catch all the market, and must serve all the demand that it faces; if more than one
ﬁrm set the same lowest price, the market is shared equally among them. Finally, the
state of Nature is realized: losses are revealed. The ﬁrms realize their investments
choices, raising if needed additional ex-post external capital.
Figure 1: Timing of the events
The game is solved backward in the two following sections.
3 Stage 2: Price competition
At stage 2, ﬁrms compete on price with the objective to maximize their expected
value EP i(w˜if ). The case of symmetric ﬁrms is ﬁrst characterized, results are then
extended to the case of ﬁrms endowed with diﬀerent levels of internal capital.
3.1 Symmetric ﬁrms
Suppose that at the beginning of stage 2, ﬁrms have the same level of internal capital,
that is for all i, j, i 6= j, wi1 = wj1. The functions P i(.) are supposed identical and
will be by now denoted P (.). We have
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EP (w˜if ) = P
(
pii(p, qi)−R(wi1 + pii(p, qi), qi)
)
(4)
where pii(p, qi) = qi(p − L) is the expected proﬁt of ﬁrm i. p is a symmetric Nash
equilibrium if ﬁrms can not increase their value by undercutting price. Formally
EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i
(
p,
Q(p)
n
))
≥ EP (wi1 + p˜ii(p,Q(p))) (5)
or, using the risk premium formulation
pii
(
p,
Q(p)
n
)
−R
(
wi1 + pi
i
(
p,
Q(p)
n
)
,
Q(p)
n
)
≥ pii(p,Q(p))
−R(wi1 + pii(p,Q(p)), Q(p)) (6)
Consider that ﬁrms have an outside option that gives them an expected value equal
to V out ≥ 0, which is assumed exogenous.
Deﬁnition 1. We note pout the price for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between
serving 1/nth of the market or their outside option V out
EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i
(
pout,
Q(pout)
n
))
= V out (7)
The following proposition, extending Wambach (1999)'s characterizes the Nash equi-
libria of the price competition
Proposition 1. In the case of symmetric ﬁrms, under (A1), (A3) and (A4)
a) there exists a continuum PNE = [pout, pN ] of Nash equilibrium prices p ∈ PNE,
where pN is deﬁned by
EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i
(
pN ,
Q(pN )
n
))
= E
(
wi1 + p˜ii(p
N , Q(pN ))
)
(8)
b) the maximum Nash price pN is higher than the competitive price, lower than the
maximum monopoly price when it exists, and provides a value of the ﬁrm higher than
her outside option.
Proof : see appendix.
The fact that price competition across risk-averse ﬁrms leads to multiple equilibria
has already been exhibited by Polborn (1998) and Wambach (1999). It has a strong
link with the standard price competition literature when ﬁrms exhibit decreasing
returns to scale5. When price is higher than expected cost, cutting price increases
5This result has in fact an intuitive explanation: for some values of price, a slight price cut
allows a ﬁrm to catch all the market, which increases its revenue. But at the same time the ﬁrm
is committed to serve the whole demand (which is moreover slightly higher due to the price cut),
exposing it to higher values of marginal cost and so a higher average cost of production. For low
enough output price, catching the whole market could then reduce the value of the ﬁrm.
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the expected proﬁt of the ﬁrm that makes a unilateral deviation, but also exposes
it to the increased cost of risk that arises from serving the whole market. For some
values of price, the cost for the ﬁrms of being exposed to more risk can be greater
than the expected gain from catching the whole market. In the present case, to the
fundamental trade-oﬀ between expected proﬁt and risk exposure must be added a
wealth-eﬀect term which comes from the fact that the cost of bearing risk itself is a
function of the value of expected proﬁt.
This three-terms trade-oﬀ can be represented graphically. To keep things simple,
let us consider the case of a perfectly inelastic demand equal to Q. Let si = qi/Q
denote the market share of ﬁrm i. Serving more customers exposes the ﬁrms to a
greater share of cost uncertainty, at an increasing rate. In Figure 2, both expected
proﬁt and pseudo risk premium curves are drawn as a function of the market share
in the case in the case of two ﬁrms and for two (not necessarily Nash equilibria)
prices: p0 (thin line) and p1 (thick line), with p0 < p1. There are essentially two
values of interest for the market share: Q/2 and Q. For a given price p, the expected
proﬁt of ﬁrm i, siQ(p − L), is a linear function of the market share. The certainty
equivalent of ﬁrm's wealth is simply the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt and
the risk premium, which is represented by the vertical arrows. As a preliminary, let
us consider the eﬀect of a price increase from p0 to p1. For all market shares, the
proﬁts will be higher for p1 than for p0. But the risk premium is lower because of
the wealth eﬀect: a higher expected price leads to a higher expected proﬁt, and so a
higher ﬁnal wealth of the ﬁrm. Under decreasing absolute risk aversion, this tends to
decrease the ﬁrm's sensitivity to risk. Hence, for a given market share, an increase
in price tends to increase the diﬀerence between the expected proﬁt and the risk
premium.
Let us identify the Nash Equilibrium prices. Start at price p1. At this price each ﬁrm
has an incentive to slightly decreases its price in order to catch the whole market. The
price cut simultaneously decreases the slope of the expected proﬁt line and increases
those of the risk premium, so the two curves are getting nearer, as a scissorclosing
movement. As the increase in expected proﬁt more than compensates the increase
in pseudo risk premium, price cutting is the optimal strategy. Symmetric ﬁrms cut
prices up to a certain level. In our ﬁgure, at p0, ﬁrms' value are equal at Q/2 and Q.
If one ﬁrm slightly cut its price, the increase in expected proﬁt that it would get from
catching the whole market is inferior to the loss due to the increase in risk premium.
So when the indiﬀerence price, pN in our formal analysis, is attained, no ﬁrm has an
incentive to cut its price anymore. It is graphically straightforward that this price
is not the single Nash Equilibrium. As long as ﬁrms get as much as their outside
option, the ﬁrms participate to the market. Every price between the outside option
price and the indiﬀerence price is a Nash equilibrium, since no ﬁrm has neither an
incentive to slightly increase its price (its demand would be zero) nor to decrease it
(the subsequent increase in risk would decrease the value of the ﬁrm).
To characterize how internal capital impacts the maximum Nash price, we consider
8
Figure 2: Characterization of equilibrium prices for symmetric risk-averse ﬁrms competing
on price. - Case of inelastic demand.
here an assumption which is slightly stronger than DARA. Let us denote
∆R = R(wi1 + p¯i(p
N , Q(pN )), Q(pN ))−R(wi1 + p¯i(pN ,
Q(pN )
n
),
Q(pN )
n
)
and assume that
• (A5) ∆R increases in w.
With DARA (A2) only, the global eﬀect of a multiplicative risk on the risk premium
is ambiguous in general. This is link to a double eﬀect: an increase of market share
corresponds to 1. an increase in endowment decreasing the risk premium through
the DARA hypothesis 2. an increase in risk, increasing the risk premium through
the risk aversion hypothesis. (A5) states that prices are in a region were the risk
eﬀect is ampliﬁed by the wealth eﬀect: the more capitalised ﬁrms are less reluctant
to serve higher demand -and hold more risk-. This assumption leads to the following
Lemma:
Lemma 1. For symmetric ﬁrms, under assumptions (A1) to (A5), ∂p
N
∂w1
≤ 0
Proof : see appendix.
Thus when the level of ﬁrms' internal capital is high, i.e. ﬁrms are less risk averse, the
competitive pressure they can exert is then high, and leads to a lower the maximum
Nash price.
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3.2 Asymmetric ﬁrms
Let us consider the asymmetric continuation equilibrium where ﬁrms enter stage 2
with diﬀerent levels of capital. It is important to consider the asymmetric equilibrium
of stage 2 since capital is the strategic variable at the ﬁrst stage, and we should be
able to describe how unilateral deviations modify the outcome of the game. We
consider the case of an oligopoly of ﬁrms i = 1...n: wn1 > w
i
1 > w
1
1. Under DARA,
diﬀerence in the level of available capital lead to diﬀerences in the degree of risk
aversion, which impact the price competition game. The less risk averse ﬁrm is the
ﬁrm with the higher initial capital, that is ﬁrm n.
Deﬁnition 2. We consider an oligopoly of n risk averse ﬁrms. We note poutmax the
maximum of the prices for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between serving 1/nth of
the market or their outside option V out
poutmax = max
i=1..n
{
pouti : EP (w
i
1 + p˜i
i(p,Q(p)/n)) = V out
}
(9)
Hence we can state the following proposition, focusing on n-oligopoly prices, that is
the case where poutmax < p
N
min
Proposition 2. In the case of asymmetric ﬁrms, under (A1) to (A5), if poutmax <
pNmin:
a) There exists a continuum PNE = [poutmax, p
N
min] of Nash equilibrium prices p ∈ PNE
for the n-oligopoly, where pNmin is deﬁned as
pNmin = min
i=1..n
{
pNi : EP (w
i
1 + p˜i
ii(p,Q(p)/n)) = EP (wi1 + p˜i
i(p,Q(p)))
}
(10)
b) The maximum Nash price pNmin corresponds to the indiﬀerence price for the less
risk averse ﬁrm between serving the whole market and serving 1/nth of it. pNmin is
higher than the competitive price, lower than the maximum monopoly price when it
exists, and provides a value of the ﬁrm higher than her outside option.
Proof : see appendix.
Note that in the case where poutmax > p
N
min, the diﬀerence between the ﬁrms initial
capital is such that the competitive pressure exerted by the less risk averse ﬁrms i
leads to a situation where the more risk averse ﬁrm can not aﬀord to stay in the
market at such price. But the other ﬁrms i can then still sustain the risk of all the
market.
An equilibrium can be reach with asymmetrically capitalised ﬁrms. The less capi-
talised the ﬁrm, the less oligopolistic rent it can extract. This leads to a situation
where the market is divided between less ﬁrms. Other Nash equilibria may be ob-
tained in the case where poutmax < p
N
min, with less than n ﬁrms (see appendix).
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Figure 3: Characterization of equilibrium prices for DARA ﬁrms with diﬀerent level
of capital competing on price - Case of inelastic demand - wj1 > w
i
1.
A graphical explanation may give the intuition of the proof. For a same level of
coverage of the market, the risk premium of ﬁrm i Ri is higher than ﬁrm j's risk
premium Rj . As in the symmetric case, the case of inelastic demand is considered.
As ﬁrm i is more risk averse than ﬁrm j, pNi > p
N
j . We focus on the case where
poutmax < p
N
min. For all p > p
N
i , both ﬁrms prefer serving the whole market and thus
may deviate from price to conquer it; pNi ≥ p > pNj ﬁrm j prefers the whole market
and thus will lower the price to conquer it; if p = pNj , then ﬁrm j is indiﬀerent
between serving the whole market or half of it, and ﬁrm i prefers serving half of
it, thus pNj is a Nash equilibrium price. Thus, with a similar argument than in the
symmetric case, for pNj ≥ p ≥ poutmax there is a Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 illustrates
this case. Both ﬁrms share the same expected proﬁts. The risk premium curves
correspond for each ﬁrm to the risk premium value for their indiﬀerence prices. As
ﬁrm i's risk premium curves is always higher than ﬁrm j's. We can graphically see
that the indiﬀerence price for ﬁrm i is higher than for ﬁrm j. Thus, we have shown
that in the case of a duopoly of asymmetric DARA ﬁrms, there exists a continuum
of Nash equilibrium prices p. The higher Nash equilibrium price pNj corresponds to
the indiﬀerence price for the less risk averse ﬁrm, between serving the whole market
and serving only one half of it.
3.3 Selecting a unique equilibrium price
The existence of multiple equilibrium prices raises the question of their selection.
This is especially important in our two-stage setting since the anticipated Nash
equilibrium price will be determinant for ﬁrms' choices of capital holding in the
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preceding stage. A possible argument relies on a collusion analysis6. Since ﬁrms do
not collude in our model, it seems natural to favour the Nash equilibrium price(s)
that are more robust to collusion. Let us consider a collusive group, but without
punishment (short-run price competition) . For collusion to be credible in this case,
all collusive equilibria should be Nash equilibria, i.e. an element of the set of Nash
equilibrium prices between [pout, pN ] since any price higher than pN does not resist
to unilateral deviation (price undercutting). Thus without punishment possibilities,
the highest price of this set, pN is likely to be chosen and applied in a collusive
agreement.
Another argument also pleads for the selection of the highest price. Intuition suggests
that high equilibrium prices are more likely to deter collusion, since they let ﬁrms
with high oligopolistic rents and so reduce the size of punishment if a price war occurs
after some ﬁrms break the collusive agreement. Formally, let us consider a collusive
price pC strictly above the maximum Nash equilibrium price, i.e. pC > pN . Suppose
that the n ﬁrms are identical with each ﬁrm's expected value written as V (p, n) for
a given price p when the n ﬁrms share the market equally. Let δ be the discount
factor, identical among ﬁrms, and T the number of periods over which collusion is
supposed to take place. Under collusion, each ﬁrm gets
V = (1 + δ + δ2...+ δT )V (pC , n) (11)
If a ﬁrm slightly undercuts the price to pC − , it get V (pC − , 1) in the ﬁrst
period, which is higher than V (pC , n) for an  is close to zero. But such unilateral
deviation triggers a price war that leads to V (pNE , n) in the following periods, with
pNE ∈ PNE . Hence, ﬁrms will stick to the collusive price if
(1 + δ + δ2...)V (pC , n) ≥ V (pC − , 1) + (δ + δ2...)V (pNE , n)
Strict equality deﬁnes a threshold δlim above which collusion occurs. For T = +∞,
this threshold is equal to
δlim =
V (pC , 1)− V (pC , n)
V (pC , 1)− V (pNE , n)
Since V (pNE , n) strictly increases with pNE , δlim increases with pNE . Hence the
intuition that collusion is less likely to occur for higher equilibrium prices is veriﬁed.
In this sense, the highest Nash equilibrium price pN can be selected as the more
robust to collusion. In the following section, in which stage 1 choice of capital is
characterized, ﬁrms will be assumed to anticipate this pN as the outcome of price
competition without any uncertainty.
6Another kind of argument in favour of pN can also be found in the framework of evolutionary
game theory, but we do not develop it in details here.
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4 Stage 1: Capital choice
At stage 1, ﬁrms non-cooperatively determine their levels of additional capital, Ki.
We look for the Nash equilibria, that is a set of strategies (K1, ..,Kn) such that there
is not any proﬁtable unilateral deviation for any ﬁrm. Since the ﬁrm(s) with the
highest level of internal capital determine(s) the market price pN (max[K1, ...,Kn])7,
while the competitors take the price as given, one must distinguish price-making
and price-taking ﬁrms when studying the consequences of marginal deviations. The
price-making ﬁrms take into account the strategic, product-market eﬀect of their
internal capital when choosing it, while price-taking ﬁrms do not. We deﬁne the
objective function of the ﬁrms below.
Deﬁnition 3. The value of the ﬁrm net of capital, Vi(.), is deﬁned as follows 8
Vi : (K1, ..,Kn)→ P
[
wi1 + pi
(
pN (K)
)−R(wi1 + pi(pN (K)), Q(pN (K)))]− (1 + τ)Ki
where K = max[K1, ...,Kn].
Depending on the status of the ﬁrm (price taking or price making), the behaviour
of the function is quite diﬀerent. For a ﬁrm where Ki = K the anticipated Nash
price is a function of Ki. Otherwise, the anticipated Nash price only depends on
an exogenous K¯. Such formal clariﬁcation being made, we are now able to study
the stage 1 subgame in more depth. The ﬁrst step is to characterize the behavior of
Vi(.), and the sign of a marginal deviation, in the symmetric case.
a) Marginal deviation of a price-taking ﬁrm
For a price-taking ﬁrm, K = max[K1, ...,Kn] ≥ Ki. In the symmetric case, we are
looking at the sign of the ﬁrst order derivative of Vi, for an exogenous price equal to
pNKi
V ′iTaker(K
i) = (1−R1)Pw︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB
− (1 + τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCdirect
(12)
The ﬁrst-order derivative formalizes the trade-oﬀ between the marginal cost of cap-
ital, MCdirect, and the marginal beneﬁt of reducing the cost of risk for the ﬁrm,
MB. If capital is not costly to hold, i.e. τ = 0, the ﬁrst-order derivative becomes
(1−R1)Pw − 1 which is always positive since by assumption R1 ≤ 0 and Pw ≥ 1.
b) Marginal deviation of a price-making ﬁrm
For a price-making ﬁrm, K = max[K1, ...,Kn] = Ki. The ﬁrst-order derivative of
Vi(Ki) is written as
7The following results are true for all anticipated strategies of equilibrium prices p(K1, ...,Kn)
such that ∂p
N
∂w1
≤ 0 (Lemma 1).
8The ex-ante value of the ﬁrm evaluated at pB is the same for serving a part of the market or
the whole market. For the sake of simplicity, we work on the whole market expression.
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V ′iLeader(K
i) = (1−R1)Pw︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB
−
[
Q′(pN )R2 − ∂pi
∂pN
(1−R1)
]
∂pN
∂Ki
Pw︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCstrategic
− (1 + τ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MCdirect
(13)
When the ﬁrm i is the most capitalized, it has to take into account the strategic
eﬀect due to product market competition MCstrategic in addition to the direct cost-
of-risk reduction incentive MB and the marginal direct cost MCdirect in its capital
budgeting decision. This strategic eﬀect represents a cost, since increasing internal
capital reduces the market price set at stage 2 (Lemma 1). It is decomposed into
two distinct terms that correspond to the following eﬀects. The ﬁrst one, strategic
wealth eﬀect, is equal to
MCstratW (Ki) = −∂p
N
∂Ki
∂pi
∂pN
(1−R1)Pw
Indeed because of increased competitive pressure, the increase in expected ﬁnal
wealth due to more capital is partly counterbalanced by lower expected proﬁts. If
the price-making ﬁrm i chooses its capital in a naive way, i.e. without considering
this eﬀect, it would overvalue its expected ﬁnal wealth, and so the real cost of risk
in its capital budgeting decision. The second term that we name strategic demand
eﬀect is equal to
MCstratD(Ki) =
∂pN
∂Ki
Q′(pN )R2Pw
It is null when the demand is price-inelastic. By lowering the market price, a marginal
increase in capital commits each ﬁrm to serve a higher demand, and so exposes them
to a higher level of risk.
c) Assumption of concavity
The question of the sign of both marginal deviations is important to understand the
trade-oﬀ of the players. We make the two following assumptions and deﬁne in the
following manner the levels of external capital K∗ and K+
• (A6a) ∀ Ki, V ′′iLeader(K) ≤ 0 and ∃Ki∗ : V ′iLeader(Ki∗) = 0
• (A6b) ∀ Ki, V ′′iTaker(K) ≤ 0 and ∃Ki+ : V ′iTaker(Ki+) = 0
(A6) makes the analysis tractable. K∗ deﬁnes the level of capital under which the
price-maker ﬁrm has interest to deviate by increasing its level of capital. Whereas
K+ deﬁnes the level above which the price-taking ﬁrm has interest to deviate by
lowering its capital. Note that V ′iLeader(K
i) = V ′iTaker(K
i) −MCstrategic. It follows
directly that K∗ < K+.
d) Equilibria characterisation
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Following the previous discussion, we place ourselves under assumption (A6) in the
case of a symmetric oligopoly of n ﬁrms, characterized by their initial wealth w0.
Since ﬁrms are perfectly symmetric, for all i, j Ki∗ = Kj∗ = K∗ and Ki+ = Kj+ =
K+ . We have the following proposition
Proposition 3. Under assumptions (A1) to (A6), if w10 = ... = w
n
0 = w0, there
exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria K1 = ... = Kn = K such that K∗ ≤ K ≤
K+.
Proof : see appendix.
Figure 4: Equilibrium capital choices
Figure 4 provides a graphical illustration of the continuum of Nash symmetric equi-
libria. The curve represents the net value function V (.). The right-hand arrows
correspond to the marginal net value of an increase of capital for a price-making
ﬁrm, whereas the left-hand arrows show the marginal net value of a decrease of capi-
tal, for price-taking ﬁrm. When K < K∗, a ﬁrm has no incentives to decrease capital
as the marginal net value of being the follower is negative, whereas the marginal net
value of increasing capital and being leader is positive. Thus it is driven to K = K∗.
For all K between K∗ and K+, the ﬁrm has no interest in increasing nor lowering
its capital level as both would induce a lower net beneﬁt (as taker or leader). For K
higher than K+ however, there is no incentive for the ﬁrm to increase capital, but
as a follower it has an interest in lowering her capital level as marginal net value for
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holding one more units of capital is too low compared to the cost of holding it. This
leads to a continuum of Nash Equilibrium of which one can select the set leading to
the higher ﬁrm's value as in the case of the equilibrium price.
The case of asymmetric ﬁrms follows simply. To grasp the intuition of the game,
consider 2 ﬁrms l respectively h, with a low, respectively high, level of initial capital:
wl0 < w
h
0 . First note that if assumption (A6a) holds for VlLeader, it holds for VhLeader
(see appendix E). The ﬁrm with the lowest level of initial capital is the more risk
averse. To have the same level of risk aversion, ﬁrm l has to hold much more costly
capital than ﬁrm h. As the cost of capital is linear, they will both obtain their
maximal net value for the same level of wealth w¯ = wl0 +K
∗
l = w
h
0 +K
∗
h. As long as
ﬁrm l does not have the same amount of wealth as ﬁrm h, it has interest to hold the
same total of capital, up to K+, level at which it is to costly to hold capital. This
leads to the following Proposition
Proposition 4. Under assumptions (A1) to (A6), if w10 < ... < w
n
0 , there exists a
continuum of Nash equilibria (K1, ...,Kn), where ∀ i < n, Ki = K∗1 + w1 − wi, and
K∗1 ≤ Kn ≤ K+1 .
Proof : see appendix.
For reasons similar to those developed to select the Nash equilibrium price, we focus
on the level of capital that maximizes ﬁrm's net value. Due to its implicit deﬁnition,
K∗ depends on the initial level of capital w0. Intuitively a high level of initial capital
could lead to a Nash equilibrium of no additional capital. Following Proposition 3,
we can show that in this case, that is when V ′i (0) > 0, K = 0 is a Nash equilibria.
e) Analysis of the results
The model provides a framework with an endogenous choice of capital that accounts
for speciﬁcities of the insurance market. It enhances the strategic role of capital in
the product market competition of insurance ﬁrms. Indeed, ﬁrms have two diﬀerent
ways to manage risks. The ﬁrst one is by acquiring more capital at ﬁrst stage to lower
their risk premium. The second one is by setting a higher price everything else being
equal at the second stage. Both ways to hedge interact in a price competition setting.
Indeed the opportunity cost of capital limits the amount of capital an insurance
company may hold before subscription. A higher level of capital however induces a
decrease in insurers' cost of risk. This allows for a more aggressive attitude on the
market, a decrease in their equilibrium prices and thus an increase in the quantity
insurers deliver. Thus the level of capital is limited by its strategic cost in addition
to the cost of holding it.
The model allows for a double set of continuum of equilibrium : continuum of equi-
librium prices at a ﬁxed capacity, and continuum of sets of capital choices, when
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anticipating the maximum Nash Price pN . Following the arguments developed pre-
viously we focus on the equilibrium extracting the highest rents for the ﬁrms, that
is the set of K∗ and the equilibrium price pN .
Corollary 1. In the preceding framework, following a symmetric negative shock on
initial wealth level, prices rise and global market capacity decreases.
The same results hold in the case of a positive shock on the cost of capital.
Proof : The concavity of function Vi(.) leads to the result, derived from Proposition
3.
This result is interesting for the study of cycles. A high cost event in an industry with
uncertainty on costs leads to a decrease of the capital available. In our framework,
a lower initial capital leads to a lower level of capital (initial and external) at the
end of Stage 1, due to the cost of additional capital. The higher resulting price on
the product market leads in the case of an elastic demand to a contraction of the
industry's global capacity.
Note that in the preceding symmetric framework, a higher cost of capital leads to
higher prices on the product market as capital is more costly to hold, and thus a
contraction of the quantity supplied to the market in the case of elastic demand. An
asymmetry in cost of capital for ﬁrms leads to interesting results. The ﬁrm with the
lowest cost of capital chooses the level of capital that maximizes her net value and
leads the level of price on the market. The ﬁrms with the highest cost of capital
follows her by choosing her level of capital depending on the price ﬁxed by the other
one. This result enhances the importance of the cost of capital as a strategic variable
in the insurance industry.
An other interesting question, regarding the insurance industry, is the inﬂuence of
the number of ﬁrms on capital choice and intensity of competition.
Corollary 2. Consider the n-ﬁrms oligopoly with k ≤ n identical ﬁrms having a
higher level of internal capital than the n− k other ﬁrms. Under assumptions (A1)
to (A5), pN decreases with k.
Proof : see appendix.
Let us ﬁrst focus on the impact on the equilibrium price for a ﬁxed level of capital w1.
As the number of identical, best capitalized ﬁrms increases, the trade-oﬀ between
serving the whole market and a fraction 1/n of it is clearly modiﬁed. On the one
hand, when n becomes large, the risk from serving 1/n becomes smaller, whereas the
risk associated with serving the whole market is unchanged. Thus the diﬀerence in
terms of risk premium increases between the two options. This tends to incite ﬁrms
to keep on serving a share 1/n of the market. On the other hand, from an expected
proﬁt perspective, the incentive to cut price clearly increases when n increases, since
expected proﬁts are multiplied by n for a ﬁrm which would follow such strategy.
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Figure 5: Maximum Nash prices, for a market of 2 symmetric ﬁrms and 3 symmetric
ﬁrms - Case of inelastic demand.
Under Assumptions (A1) to (A5), this trade-oﬀ is no longer ambiguous. The graph-
ical intuition of the result is quite intuitive. Figure 5 illustrates this proposition in
the case of inelastic demand. An increase in the number of reinsurer, for the same
price, diminishes the surplus of the ﬁrm, as the quantity of the market served by
the ﬁrm is lessened (from 1/nth to 1/n + 1th). Due to the scissors eﬀect described
previously, the maximum Nash equilibrium price pNn+1 for a market with n+ 1 ﬁrms
is below the maximum Nash equilibrium price pNn for a market with n ﬁrms. Thus,
the higher the number of less risk averse ﬁrms, the lower the market price.
f) Monopoly case
As an extreme case, we consider the monopoly case. At stage 2, the monopolistic
ﬁrm is characterised by an initial wealth w0 +K. The monopolistic price, noted pM ,
is the classical solution of expected value maximization, and veriﬁes pM > pN (K).
Note that the monopolistic price is a decreasing function of the level of initial wealth
- and thus of K - as a higher level of capital induces a lower risk aversion.
At stage 1, the monopolistic ﬁrm chooses its optimal level of additional capital KM
by maximizing her net value V , anticipating the price pM (K). And we have KM =
K∗(pN ).
5 Social welfare and the need for capital regulation
In the symmetric case, social welfare SW is deﬁned as the sum of consumer surplus
CS and ﬁrms' proﬁts (i.e. the ﬁrms' values net of additional capital) with
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CS(p) =
∫ +∞
p
Q(x)dx
The social welfare function is thus written as
SW (K, p) = CS(p) + n
(
P
[
w0 +K + pi −R
(
w0 +K + pi,Q(p)/n)
]− (1 + τ)Ki)
In the case of the insurance market, it appears more realistic as prices are seldom
control except through diﬀerentiation while capital regulation is much more com-
mon9. We thus place ourselves in this second-best framework by supposing that
government has direct control over the level of ﬁrms' capital but not on prices.
Proposition 5. Under assumptions (A1) to (A5), the level of capital Kg that max-
imises social welfare is higher than K∗.
Proof. If the benevolent and omniscient government only control K, then the ﬁrst
order condition is
dpN
dK
Q′(pN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
T1
+
1
n
(
(1−R1)Pw −
[
Q′(pN )
n
R2 − ∂pi
∂pN
(1−R1)
]
∂pN
∂K
Pw − (1 + τ)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
T2
= 0
The marginal consumer surplus (T1) is positive. The second term (T2) is equal to 0
for K = K∗. Thus assuming SW concave leads to Kg > K∗.
This result implies that imperfect competition leads to under-capitalization when
compared to the social optimal capital. In our imperfect competition framework,
note that higher capital requirements could lead to more competitive prices, as ﬁrms
are less risk averse and potentially to a better social welfare. It is interesting to
point out that this model leads to a rationale for capital regulation due to imperfect
competition rather than standard solvency arguments. Note that control of capital
choice reduces the interval of equilibrium prices available at the second stage of the
game.
6 Concluding Remarks
The model extends Froot et al. (1993)'s framework by considering capital choices
in a price competition setting for risk averse insurance ﬁrms. The principal result
is the existence of a continuum of Nash equilibrium capital choices. Each level of
capital leads to a continuum of Nash equilibrium prices of which we distinguish the
one leading to ﬁrms' maximal value. We thus extends Wambach (1999)'s results,
and provide a diﬀerent analysis based on an associated risk premium: ﬁrms face
9Note that it is equivalent for the government to play on the price or on the level of capital as
they both interact, when considering that ﬁrms anticipate the maximum Nash price. However in
the case of a continuum of equilibria, this may have a diﬀerent signiﬁcation
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the trade-oﬀ between higher expected wealth and higher risk when expending their
market shares, allowing for an endogenous rationale for raising more capital. We
show that cost of capital as well as initial wealth levels of the ﬁrms have direct
impacts on the market equilibrium prices. The model provides a rationale for an
endogenous choice of capital level, as well as for capital regulation: ﬁxing a capital
level reduces the interval of equilibrium prices available at second stage and thus
may enhance social welfare. The characterisation of the dual interaction between
ﬁnancial and product market imperfections is particularly interesting to discuss in
the case of the insurance industry.
Firstly, the model provides interesting results in a cycle analysis. The model is
certainly static, but could be extended to a dynamic framework that would better ﬁt
the insurance industry questions. In her review of insurance cycle literature, Weiss
(2007) analyzes the part of literature focused on real cycles: shock theories and
explanations for crises. In the literature, two basis models are used in the classical
underwriting cycle theory: capacity constraint and risky debt hypothesis. The model
is related to a capacity constraint that emerges endogenously from the risk-aversion
of the ﬁrms and is heighten by the typical oligopolistic structure of the market.
Costly capital reinforces this eﬀect. Froot et al. (1993)'s framework allows for the
distinction between internal funds and ex-post capital i. Cost of internal capital
has been evaluated by some authors: Zanjani estimated from data over the period
1989-1998 the capital cost for insurance to be up to 13% for reinsurance lines. In
the reinsurance industry, cost of external capital may be observed with the recourse
to diﬀerent ways to raise capital after an important catastrophic events. Since the
end of the nineties, new ways for recapitalization have emerged for this industry.
Lane (2007) analyses their use by the reinsurance industry following the costly 2005
year that had seen Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma. Total cost was estimated
for the whole industry to 86,5$ bn of which 42% were supported by the reinsurance
industry. During the 15 months following the hurricanes, Lane accounts for 33,5$
bn raised by reinsurance industry10. Costs of hybrid capital may give a proxy for
the expensiveness of ex-post capital. Comparisons between recourse to external and
internal capital are however not so easy. In their study, Weiss and Chung (2004) use
reinsurance contracts over the period 1991-1995 in the US to analyze the impact of
ﬁnancial quality and global capacity on reinsurance prices. The coeﬃcients they ﬁnd
do not support the hypothesis that external equity is more costly than internal equity
but they underline that such results are to be taken with caution because recourse to
external capital much more easy to estimate than retained earnings. Further study
would be needed on this point.
Concerning the price of reinsurance, the results are in line with the latest studies on
the catastrophe reinsurance market that shows that pricing far exceed competitive
pricing in excess of loss contracts (Weiss and Chung, 2004; Froot, 2001; Froot and
10This amount is split in capital raised by ancient companies (36%), and new companies (26%),
through Insurance Linked Securities (19%), Sidecars (19%).
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O'Connell, 2008). In the present case of DARA ﬁrms, capital market imperfections
as well as product market imperfections are integrated in the market price of risk.
Concerning the impact of the cost of capital on the pricing of risks in the reinsurance
industry, Froot and O'Connell (2008) have given evidence of it, using reinsurance
data (489 US-contracts over the period 1970-1994).
In the strand of insurance literature, capital constraints were at ﬁrst been taken as
exogenous, for standard reason of regulation on the default risk - as it is the case in
(Gron, 1990). Few other models have proposed endogenous explanations for ﬁrms'
choice of level of capital. Among them, Zanjani (2002) considers risk neutral insur-
ance companies, that have limited liability. They face insolvency-carer consumers,
and thus have incentives to hold costly capital. The ﬁrm is thus confronted with a
quality/cost trade-oﬀ and diversiﬁes between the diﬀerent lines of risk. In this case,
capital requirements to maintain solvency have an impact on prices. We give here a
diﬀerent rationale for endogenous capital choice linked to strategic choices in a case
of ﬁnancial and product market imperfections. Higher level of capital retention could
lead to a lower price approaching pure competition and thus enhancing customer's
wealth. In the case of an oligopolistic market structure, this leads to interesting
conclusions in a regulatory approach. The model provides a rationale for capital
regulation, that rely on other arguments than solvency issues as classically social
failure costs with limited liability issues (Matutes and Vives, 2000). Each capital
equilibrium leads to a continuum of Nash prices from which the maximum- value
maximising price is exerted. A regulation on capital can avoid situations in which
ﬁrms are under capitalised, leading to maximum Nash prices all the more high, and
lower welfare. Capital regulation could then have a double impact: reduce ﬁrm
insolvency as classically, bu also enhance competition.
Appendix
We give here the proof of the following propositions and corollaries.
A-Proof of Proposition 1
Let us note pm the monopoly price of the symmetric ﬁrms.
Lemma 2. PNE∩]pm,+∞[= ∅
Proof (Weibull provides a similar proof in the case of convex costs of production):
Let us suppose that all ﬁrms price at p ∈ PNE , with p > pm. Firm i has a demand
qi < Q(p). As Q(p) is continuous and limp→+∞Q(p) = 0.
∃p∗ > p : Q(p∗) = qi
EP (wi1 + (p
∗ − L˜)Q(p∗)) = EP (wi1 + (p∗ − L˜)qi) > EP (wi1 + (p− L˜)qi)
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By deﬁnition, as pm is the optimal monopoly price, EP (wi1 + (p
m − L˜)Q(pm)) >
EP (wi1 + (p
∗ − L˜)Q(p∗)),
EP (wi1 + (p
m − L˜)Q(pm)) > EP (wi1 + (p− L˜)qi)
As p > pm, thus the ﬁrm i can unilaterally deviate that enhances ﬁrm's value. Thus
p is not a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. (Wambach): Under assumptions (A1) and (A3), if there is a price in
the market such that the n ﬁrms have a value equal to their outside option, the value
of any ﬁrm serving the whole market at this price is strictly smaller, formally:
EP (wi1 + p˜i
i(p,Q/n)) = V out ⇒ EP (wi1 + p˜ii(p,Q)) < V out
Proof: See Wambach (1999) for Proof.
Lemma 3 leads to p ∈ PNE if and only if EP (wi1+p˜ii(p, Q(p)n )) ≥ EP (wi1+p˜ii(p,Q(p)))
that is equivalent to p ∈ PNE if and only if p ∈ [pout, pN ]. Indeed, let us consider a
deviation of ﬁrm i when all ﬁrms set a common price p ∈ PNE . If i raises her price,
then it obtains no demand, as all the residuals ﬁrms meet the demand. If i lowers
her price, she serves the whole market, and decreases its proﬁt.
As P is concave, we have
d2
dqi2
EP (wi1 + p˜i
i(p, qi)) = E
(
(p− L˜)2Pww(wi1 + p˜ii(p, qi))
)
< 0
As pN veriﬁes EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i(pN , Q(p
N )
n )
)
= EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i(pN , Q(pN ))
)
, a price-taker
ﬁrm has an optimal output between Q(p)n and Q. From (A4), we directly obtain that
the competitive price is lower than pN .
Lemma 2 leads to the conclusion that pN is lower than the maximal monopoly price.
Let us consider p ∈ PNE . As pout = min(PNE), EP (wi1 + p˜ii(pout, Q(p
out)
n )) = V
out.
From (A3), we obtain EP (wi1 + p˜i
i(pN , Q(p
N )
n )) > V
out. Thus the value of the ﬁrms
at pN is higher than her outside option.
B-Proof of Lemma 1 :
As pNi is the indiﬀerence price for ﬁrm i for serving the whole market or half of it,
then EP
(
wi1+p˜ii(p
N , Q(p
N )
n )
)
= EP
(
wi1+p˜i
i(pN , Q(pN ))
)
. As P is strictly increasing,
this is equivalent for i, j to
p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
j )/2)−R(wi + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNj )/2), Q(pNi )/2)
= p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i ))−R(wi + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )), Q(pNi )) (14)
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Let us compare at price pNi the expected value of ﬁrm j for serving the whole market
and half of it. Assumption (A5) leads to:
R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i )/2), Q(p
N
i )/2)−R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )), Q(pNi )) >
R(wi + p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i )/2), Q(p
N
i )/2)−R(wi + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )), Q(pNi ))
Using Equation 14:
R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i )/2), Q(p
N
i )/2)−R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )), Q(pNi )) >
p¯i(pNi ,
Q(pNi )
n
)− p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi ))
Thus
p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i ))−R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )), Q(pNi )) >
p¯i(pNi , Q(p
N
i )/2)−R(wj + p¯i(pNi , Q(pNi )/2) (15)
And as P is strictly increasing, the expected value to cover the whole market is higher
than the expected value to cover half of it. Thus the indiﬀerence premium is lower
for the less risk averse ﬁrm, that is the ﬁrm with higher level of initial capital.
Thus under assumptions (A1), (A2) and (A5), in the case of symmetric ﬁrms, wj1 >
wi1 ⇒ pNi > pNj . The equation 14 implicitly deﬁning pN allows for the continuity
of pN compared to w1. Thus
∂pN
∂w1
≤ 0.
C-Proof of Proposition 2:
Case poutmax < p
N
min:
In the case where poutmax < p
N
min, Lemma 1 leads to p ∈ PNE if and only if EP (wi1 +
p˜ii(p, Q(p)n )) ≥ EP (wi1 + p˜ii(p,Q(p))) that is equivalent to p ∈ PNE if and only if
p ∈ [poutmax, pNmin]. Let us suppose that p > pNmin. The ﬁrm j that has the minimum
Nash price pNmin may lower the price and then catch the whole market. Thus p is not
a Nash Equilibrium. Then let us consider a deviation of ﬁrm i when all ﬁrms set a
common price p ∈ PNE . If i raises her price, then it obtains no demand, as all the
residuals ﬁrms meet the demand. If i lowers her price, she serves the whole market,
and decreases its proﬁt. p deﬁnes then a Nash equilibrium
The extension to an oligopoly of n ﬁrms is immediate and when poutmax > p
N
min.
However other Nash equilibrium may exists that consider less ﬁrms. In fact, for
p < poutmax, only n− 1 ﬁrms stay on the market. Let us deﬁne for the remaining ﬁrms
pn−1max the maximum of the prices for which the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between serving
1/n-1 th of the market or their outside option. If pn−1max < poutmax, there still exists a
continuum of equilibrium prices for a n− 1 oligopoly.
For m = 1..n− 1, we deﬁne for the m ﬁrms remaining in the market
pmmax = max
i=1..m
{
pouti : EP (w
i
1 + p˜i
i(p,Q(p)/m)) = EP (wi1 + p˜i
i(p,Q(p)))
}
(16)
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We note the following interval, that may be empty:
Im =
[
pmmax; max
i=m+1..n
{pmmax}
[
(17)
When assumptions (A1) to (A5) hold, in the case of non-symmetric ﬁrms that diﬀers
by their risk aversion, there exist sub markets price equilibrium intervals Im for each
m-oligopoly.
D-Second order Derivatives of V(.):
1. Price-Taking Firms. For each set of strategies (Ki), we consider the variation
of marginal net value for the price-taking ﬁrms, at the price pN (K). We note this
variation V ′′iTaker(K
i), and as marginal cost is constant, we have the following ex-
pression:
V ′′iTaker(K
i) = −
(
−R11(1 + ∂p¯i
∂K
)−R12 ∂Q
∂K
)
Pw +
(
1 +
(1−R1)∂p¯i
∂K
−R2 ∂Q
∂K
)
Pww
(18)
2. Price-Taking Firms. For each set of strategies (Ki), we consider the variation of
marginal net value for the price-making ﬁrms. The second-order derivative is given
by
VLeaderi
′′(Ki) =
[(
∂2pN
∂Ki2
∂pi
∂pN
+
∂pN
∂Ki
∂pi2
∂pN2
)
(1−R1)− T
(
TR11 +
∂pN
∂Ki
Q′(pN )R12
)
−
(
∂2pN
∂Ki2
Q′(pN ) +
∂pN
∂Ki
Q′′(pN )
)
R2
−∂p
N
∂Ki
Q′(pN )
(
TR12 +
∂pN
∂Ki
Q′(pN )R22
)]
Pw
+
[
(1−R1)− PM(K¯)
]2
Pww
where T = 1 + ∂p
N
∂Ki
∂pi
∂pN
E-Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an unilateral deviations of a ﬁrm i in the case of an n oligopoly of symmetric
ﬁrms from the symmetric Nash equilibrium candidate (K¯, K¯). Under Assumption
(A6) we only need to look at marginal deviations. We ﬁrst note that:
V ′iTaker(K
i) = V ′iLeader(K
i) +MCstratW (Ki) +MCstratD(Ki) (19)
Increasing capital: Ki > K¯.
If ﬁrm i chooses to increase its level of capital form the symmetric situation, it be-
comes the leader of the game, thus determines the market price pN (Ki). Considering
Assumption (A6):
• ∀K¯ < K∗, V ′iLeader(K¯) > 0. Hence K¯ < K∗ cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
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• ∀K¯ ≥ K∗, V ′iLeader(K¯) ≤ 0. Hence all K¯ ≥ K∗ are candidates to be a Nash
equilibrium.
Decreasing capital: Ki < K¯.
If ﬁrm i chooses a lower level of capital than the other ﬁrms then the market price
remains equal to pN (K¯), which is determined by the more capitalized ﬁrms. Con-
sidering the previous discussion:
• ∀K¯ < K∗, −V ′iTaker(K¯) = −V ′iLeader(K¯)−MCstratW (K¯)−MCstratD(K¯) ≤ 0,
Hence a marginal decrease in capital is not proﬁtable.
• ∀K+ ≥ K¯ ≥ K∗, −V ′iTaker(K¯) = −MB(K¯) + MCdirect(K¯) ≤ 0 following
assumption (A6b).
• ∀K > K¯, −V ′iTaker(K¯) = −MB(K¯) + MCdirect(K¯) ≥ 0 thus a marginal
decrease of capital is unilaterally proﬁtable.
We thus conclude that the symmetric couples of capital (K¯, K¯) are a Nash equilib-
rium for K∗ ≤ K¯ ≤ K+.
F-Proof of Proposition 4
Consider 2 ﬁrms l respectively h, with a low, resp. high, level of initial capital:
wl0 < w
h
0 . If VlLeader follows (A6a) Assumption, then V
′
lLeader is decreasing. For all
Kl, let us deﬁne Kh such that w
l
0 +Kl = w
h
0 +Kh, Kl < Kh. Thus V
′
hLeader(Kh) =
V ′lLeader(Kl + w
l
0 − wh0 ), is also decreasing in Kh. And VhLeader follows assumption
(A6a). Both ﬁrms rach their maximum net value (for leader) for the same level of
capital wl0 +K
∗
l = w
h
0 +K
∗
h where K
∗
h < K
∗
l .
We use the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 3. Consider ﬁrm h. For all
Kh ≤ K∗h, ﬁrm h when being the leading ﬁrm has the interest for increasing her level
of external capital. In this situation, ﬁrm l has always interest to increase as well
her level of external capital up to K∗l , where the Nash price is p
N (wh0 +K
∗
h).
For all K∗h ≤ Kh ≤ K+h , ﬁrm h, as the leading ﬁrm, has no interest to increase her
level of external capital, neither has she interest to lower it price-taking ﬁrm. For
all K∗l ≤ Kl ≤ K+l , ﬁrm l as the leading ﬁrm has no interest to any deviation, when
wl0 +Kl = w
h
0 +Kh.
Let us note KMh : w
l
0 + K
+
l = w
h
0 + K
M
h . For all Kh > K
M
h , ﬁrm h is the leading
ﬁrm, as she is less risk averse. l chooses the level of external capital maximizing her
net value as a follower, K < K+h , and ﬁrm h thus beneﬁts from lowering her level of
capital. So for all Kh > K
M
h , there are no Nash equilibrium.
G-Proof of Corollary 2:
We provide the proof of the corollary for the case of n symmetric ﬁrms. We consider
n+ 1 ﬁrms with the same initial wealth w1 that compete on price. We note pNn the
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maximum Nash price of the competition of n of these ﬁrms, and pNn+1 the maximum
Nash price for n+ 1 ﬁrms. By deﬁnition
EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i(pNn ,
Q(pNn )
n
)
)
= EP
(
wi1 + p˜ii(p
N
n , Q)
)
or EP (wi1 +
p˜ii(p
N
n ,Q)
n ) = EP (w
i
1 + p˜ii(p
N
n , Q)). The concavity of P leads to the
concavity of EP in the output. Thus, for pNn , EP (w
i
1 +
n
n+1
p˜ii(p
N
n ,Q)
n ) < EP (w
i
1 +
p˜ii(pNn , Q)) that is
EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i(pNn ,
Q(pNn )
n+ 1
)
)
< EP
(
wi1 + p˜ii(p
N
n , Q)
)
Thus all ﬁrms prefer serving the whole market to (n+1)th of it at pNn . As all functions
are continuous, a small decrease in price will not violate the condition of equilibrium
for a market with n + 1 symmetric ﬁrms that is EP
(
wi1 + p˜i
i(pNn+1,
Q(pNn+1)
n+1 )
)
=
EP
(
wi1 + p˜ii(p
N
n+1, Q)
)
. Thus, using (A4), pNn+1 < p
N
n .
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